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I. INTRODUCTION
The Michigan Supreme Court's ruling in County of Wayne v. Hathcock'
that article X, section 2 of the Michigan Constitution of 19632 prohibits any
exercise of the power of eminent domain to transfer property from one
private owner to another for the "public use" of "alleviating unemployment
and revitalizing the economic base of the community"3 is unprecedented in
Michigan takings jurisprudence. The Hathcock decision rewrote the state's
constitution and removed the power of the legislature to meet the economic
necessities of the people of Michigan. Departing from solidly reasoned
Michigan eminent domain law based upon public necessity and public
benefit, the Hathcockcourt wrongfully overturned Poletown Neighborhood
Council v. Detroit,4 which permitted the use of eminent domain to alleviate
unemployment as a public necessity. The Michigan Supreme Court's
holding in Hathcock goes beyond a misunderstanding of Michigan law or
a misreading of Poletown to imposing an economic ideology on the state
legislature and the people of Michigan.
1. 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
2. MICH. CONST. of 1963, art. X, § 2.
3. Hathcock 684 N.W.2d at 787.
4. 304N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981). The overruling of Poletown will potentially have a
crippling effect on the city of Detroit's ability to rebuild. The city is one of the most
distressed in the nation, with the highest poverty rate of any major municipality. Patricia
Montemurri et al., Detroit Tops Nation in Poverty Census, DET. FREE PRESS, available at
http://www.freep.com(last visited Jan. 23, 2006). Detroit hasused its condemnation power
to facilitate construction of the General Motors Poletown and Chrysler auto assembly plants,
Brush Park and Jefferson Village neighborhoods, Comerica Park and Ford Field stadiums,
integral parts of Detroit's theater district, and sections of the Detroit Medical Center. The
city's future in the twenty-first-century hinges upon creating greater economic opportunity
for more than a half million residents who have moderate to low family incomes or who are
trapped in poverty. Without adequate income, residents cannot maintain their homes, meet
daily needs, support local shops, or provide taxes to fund city services. Developers view the
prospect of having to assemble vast tractsofdistressed, obsolete land into majorproject sites
without using the power of eminent domain as sheer folly. Separate negotiations of the
thousands of property interests involved in any one project would be unduly expensive, time
consuming and would face the possibility of being blocked by one owner's refusal to sell.
The use of eminent domain to facilitate economic development was recently upheld as a
"public use"under the Fifth Amendmentto the U.S. Constitution by the U.S. Supreme Court
inKelo v. City of New London, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005), under circumstances similar tothose
in Poletown.
1332 [Vol. 51:1331
2005] UNPRECEDENTED OVERRULING OF POLETOWN
A number of factors suggest that the Hathcock decision is a classical
case of judicial legislation, not the least of which is that the Hathcock
property owners could have been protected against eminent domain by a
clarification of the Poletown holding. In electing to overrule Poletown, the
Michigan Supreme Court (1) recast Poletown as a case involving
maximizing profits for a private company, rather than alleviating
unemployment in the community;5 (2) excluded an entire category of use,
alleviation of unemployment, from takings jurisprudence;6 (3) limited the
types of persons or corporations that could receive property through
eminent domain to "instrumentalities of commerce" unless "facts of
independent public significance" exist;7 (4) held that the meaning of the
term "public use" is frozen on the date of adoption of the 1963
Constitution;8 and (5) ruled that the term "public use" is not to be based
upon the common understanding of the voters that ratified the Constitution,
but rather upon the understanding of "persons sophisticated in the law." 9
Since the enactment of the Northwest Ordinance in 178710 all Michigan
cases holding the exercise of the power of eminent domain to be
unconstitutional have done so on the basis that the taking (a) was not for a
"public necessity" 1  or (b) did not primarily benefit the public.12 The
holding that a taking for a specific category of use is unconstitutional when
a court finds that a "public necessity" exists and the public is the primary
beneficiary, as was found in Poletown, is unsupported by Michigan takings
jurisprudence. 3 While Poletown was controversial, the case was properly
5. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 786.
6. Id. at 787.
7. Id. at 782-83.
8. Id. at 787.
9. Id. at 780.
10. 1787 Gov't of Northwest Territory art. II.
11. Peterman v. DNR, 521 N.W.2d 499 (Mich. 1994); McDonald v. Marquette Circuit
Judge, 123 N.W. 1112 (Mich. 1909); Pere Marquette R.R. Co. v. Gypsum Co., 117 N.W.
733 (Mich. 1908); Ryersonv. Brown, 35 Mich. 333 (1877); McClaryv. Hartwell, 25 Mich.
139 (1872); People ex rel. Trombley v. Auditor-General, 23 Mich. 471 (1871).
12. Toldsdorf v. Griffith, 626 N.W.2d 163 (Mich. 2001); City of Lansing v. Edward
RoseRealty, Inc., 502 N.W.2d 638 (Mich. 1993); Shizas v. City ofDetroit, 52 N.W.2d 589
(Mich. 1952); Berrien Springs Water-Power Co. v. Berrien Circuit Judge, 94 N.W. 379
(Mich. 1903); Board of Health of Portage Twp. v. Van Hoesen, 49 N.W.894 (Mich. 1891);
Ryerson, 35 Mich. 333. SeeMansfield, Coldwater &Lake Mich. R.R. Co. v. Clark, 23 Mich.
519(1871).
13. Ryerson is the principal case relied upon by Justice Ryan in his Poletown dissent
and the Hathcock court for the proposition that when a private corporation is involved the
necessity must be one "of the extreme sort." Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 645-83. See also
Hathcock 684 N.W.2d 765. However, in Ryerson, Justice Cooley found that the legislation
did not assure a primary benefit to the public, nor was there any "public necessity" for the
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decided and has no basis for being overturned.
The Hathcock court has complicated eminent domain law in Michigan
by introducing a new approach to interpreting the term "public use," known
as "originalism."' 14 This approach is not supported by any previous
Michigan courts or scholars writing on Michigan takings jurisprudence. Its
adoption prohibits the exercise of eminent domain to address changing
needs and conditions of society after the ratification of the 1963
Constitution. I"
Justice Young writing for the Hathcock majority and Justice Weaver in
her concurring opinion rely heavily upon the writings of Justice Thomas M.
Cooley, referred to by the court as "our patron saint."' 6 There is little
taking. Ryerson, 35 Mich. at 334-35. In Justice Cooley's words:
[T]here is nothing in the present legislation to indicate that the power obtained
under it is to be employed directly for the public use. Any sort of manufacture
may be set up under it, and the proprietor is not obligated in any manner to carry
it on for the benefit of the locality or of the state at large. He is not bound to
consider the interest of the locality or of the state; and nothing but the requirement
that his devoting the power to purposes which public opinion would not sanction.
The statute appears to have been drawn with studious care to avoid any
requirement that the person availing himself of its provisions shall consult any
interest except his own.
Id. at 338.
14. In the context of U.S. Constitutional interpretation, originalism is a family of
theories which share the starting point that a constitution or statute does not evolve in
meaning, but rather, has a fixed and knowable meaning, which should be adhered to by
Judges. See Doug Linder, Exploring Constitutional Law, available at
http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/interp.html (last visited Jan. 23,
2006). The key to originalism is that interpretive decisions made by Judges should be based
on facts about the document when it was originally written or ratified, with minimal
adjustments for the time of context in which it is interpreted. Id.
15. The application of originalism to the case formed the ultimate basis for the
Hathcockcourt to reject the principles of Poletown in its decision:
Because Poletown's conception of a public use-that of 'alleviating
unemployment and revitalizing the economic base of the community'-has no
support in the Court's eminent domain jurisprudence before the Constitution's
ratification, its interpretation of 'public use' in art. X, § 2 cannot reflect the
common understanding of that phrase among those sophisticated in the law at
ratification.
Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 787.
16. Id. at 779 n.48. Justice Thomas M. Cooley (1824-1898) is one of the most highly
respected jurists and scholars in Michigan legal history. See Thomas McIntyre Cooley,
availableatwww.cooley.edu/overview/tmctheman.htm (lastvisited Nov. 28, 2005).He first
gained recognition when, pursuant to an 1857 act of the legislature, he was appointed to
compile the statutes of the state into "The Compiled Laws of the State of Michigan." Id.
Thereafter, he was appointed the official reporter of the Michigan Supreme Court. Id. In
1859, Cooley became one of the first faculty members of the University of Michigan Law
School. Id. He was appointed to the Michigan Supreme Court in 1864, and served on the
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argumentthat the founding principles ofMichigan takings jurisprudence are
based upon the 19th-century works of Justice Cooley. These works,
however, do not support the Hatchcock holding. The court's interpretation
of Cooley's writings are wholly misguided and, in some instances, his
teachings are taken out of context or totally disregarded.
II. POLETO WN AND HATHCOCK
Hathcockwas decided amidst concern throughout the country that local
governments were abusing the power of eminent domain to further private
economic interests.17 The concern centered on the need to overturn
Poletown, widely regarded as the seminal state case holding that the state
legislature could authorize use of the power of eminent domain to further
economic development purposes. 8
At issue in both Poletown and Hathcock was the meaning of article X,
section 2 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963: "Private property shall not
be taken for public use without just compensation therefor being first made
or secured in a manner prescribed by law."' 9 This provision finds its roots
in the Northwest Ordinance of 178720 governing the territory of Michigan,
and similar provisions have been included in each of the state's
constitutions, beginning with the state's first in 1835.21
The words of Michigan's 1963 Constitution are nearly identical to the
language contained in the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution ratified
in 1789: "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.' ' 2 The Supreme Court has construed the Fifth Amendment
court until his retirement in 1885, authoring a number of landmark opinions. Id. Justice
Cooley wrote countless articles on legal subjects and wrote full-length works on
Constitutional Limitations, Blackstone's Commentaries, Story's Commentaries, and Torts.
Id.
17. See DANA BERLINER, PUBLIC P OWER, PRIVATE GAIN: A FIVE-YEAR, STATE-BY -
STATE REPORT EXAMINING THE ABUSE OF EMINENT DOMAIN (2003).
18. See Timothy Sandefur,A Gleeful Obituaryfor PoletownNeighborhood Council v.
Detroit, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 651, 664 (2005). See also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
TAKINGS: PRIVATE P ROPERTYAND THE POWEROF EMINENT DOMAIN, 179-80 (1985); Joseph
L. Sax, Some Thoughts on the Decline of Private Property, 58 WASH. L. REV. 481, 489-90
(1983).
19. MICH. CONST. of 1963 art. X, § 2.
20. 1787 Gov't of Northwest Territory, art. II.
21. The Constitution was ratified by the people of the territory in 1835 and Michigan
was granted statehood in 1837. See The Official State of Michigan Website, available at
http://www.michigan.gov/hal/0,1607,7-160-15481_20826_20829-56001--,00.html (last
visited Jan. 23, 2006).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Courts and scholars have described the Fifth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution as the "Just Compensation Clause." There is little affirmative
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as applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution adopted in 1868.23 Accordingly, landowners in Michigan, such
as those plaintiffs in Hathcock and the residents of the Poletown
neighborhood, are protected against unlawful takings by state agencies and
local governments under provisions of both the Michigan and U.S.
Constitutions.
III. THE POLETOWN CASE
The Poletown case arose in the late 1970s, at a time when the severity
of economic decline facing Detroit was beginning to cause widespread
alarm within the city and the state. While the majority opinion in Poletown
provides little detail, Justice Ryan in his dissent describes the conditions in
stark terms:
It is difficult to overstate the magnitude of the crisis.
Unemployment in the state of Michigan is at 14.2%. In the City of
Detroit it is at 18%, and among black citizens, it is almost 30%....
To meet [foreign] competition, domestic manufacturers are finding
it necessary to construct new manufacturing facilities in order to
build redesigned, lighter and more economical cars.24
Outdated World War I vintage multi-story plants needed to be replaced by
more efficient, expansive single-story manufacturing complexes pioneered
during World War 11.25 Reducing production space to a single-story required
evidence that the Framers understood the words "for public use" in the Just Compensation
Clause to incorporate any kind of substantive limitation on the ends to which the power of
eminent domain may be devoted. These words may have been intended merely to describe
the type of taking for which just compensation must be given - a taking of specific private
property by public authority as opposedto some other type of taking, such as a taking by tort
or taxation. See DAVID A.DANA& THOMASW. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS, 8-25 (2002);
Matthew P. Harrington, "Public Use" and the Original Understanding of the So-Called
"Takings " Clause, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1245 (2002). Nevertheless, "for public use" has been
read throughout U.S. history as imposing an implied limitation on the exercise of eminent
domain-that it can be used only for public and not private uses-and the U.S. Supreme
Court has accepted this interpretation. See Brown v. Legal Found. of Washington, 538 U.S.
216, 231-32 (2003); Thompson v. Consol. Gas Util. Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937).
23. The U.S. Supreme Court began applying the Fifth Amendment to the states at the
end of the 19th-century. SeeKelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2655 n.9.
24. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 465-66 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
25. New automobile assembly plants were required to be single-story, a design
characteristic that increases the energy efficiency of the entire operation as opposed to
moving auto bodies vertically through the existing multi-level assembly plants. Id. at 466
(Ryan, J., dissenting).
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the use of much larger land areas to locate new automobile plants within the
city.
In 1973, Detroit elected its first African-American mayor, Coleman A.
Young. 6 In that year the mayor and corporate leaders of Detroit formed
Detroit Renaissance, a CEO council, to jointly address the economic crisis
facing the city.27 No manufacturing plants of the big three domestic
automobile companies, General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler, had yet been
closed, however, it was generally anticipated that the retirement of aging
plants was inevitable.
Mayor Young asked the heads of all three companies for the
opportunity to locate new or replacement plants in Detroit when a decision
was made to build them. In response to this request, General Motors
informed Mayor Young of the closing of the Fisher Body and Cadillac
Plants in Southwest Detroit and the relocation of the 6,000 positions at the
plants to a new combined facility. GM executives provided the mayor with
a time schedule and site specifications for a large modem manufacturing
complex which the company was prepared to build outside of the city and,
perhaps, outside of the Detroit metropolitan region on a 465 acre "green
field" site.
2:
Although the City investigated nine separate sites, each of which
required major land assembly within existing residential neighborhoods,
only one site, anchored by the recently closed Dodge Main Plant, was found
suitable for the project.29 The obsolete multi-story manufacturing plant
straddled the Detroit and Hamtramck border and required demolition.30 It
was built at an earlier time when neither city had a master plan, zoning
26. Coleman Alexander Young (1918-1997) was the first African-American elected
Mayor of the City of Detroit. See Coleman A. Young, President Emeritus of the Coleman
A. Young Foundation: A Life of Struggle Becomes...a Rich Legacy, available at
http://www.cayf.org/bio-cay.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2005). He was elected in 1973, and
served five terms through 1993, receiving wide margins in four succeeding elections. Id.
Young was faced with major declines in the city's population, job base, and housing stock
during his twenty years of administration. Id. He attempted to forge close alliances with the
corporate leaders of the city to spur industrial and commercial revitalization in the face of
widespread disinvestment. Id.
27. Detroit Renaissance was founded in 1970by business leadersto transformthe city's
disinvestment and decline into a promising economic future. See Detroit Renaissance
Profile, available at http://www.detroitrenaissance.com (last visited Nov. 28, 2005). The
majorthrust of the organization's programs in the 1970s was to stimulate building activity
in Detroit. Id. Its board was comprised of chief executive officers of member organizations
and only they could attend the group's board meetings. Id. The Mayor of the city was a
member of the Detroit Renaissance board. Id.
28. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 460 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
29.Id.
30. Id. at 460 n.2.
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ordinance, or building code. 3' As a result, blocks of houses, built to varying
standards, were tucked up next to the factory gates.32 Automobile
transportation was not widely available to most families at the time the
Dodge Main Plant was built and most workers walked or rode public
transportation to work.33 Any major expansion of the site required intrusion
into the surrounding neighborhood, as was the case of all other sites under
investigation.
34
The neighborhood was first occupied by immigrants of Polish decent
prior to World War I, hence the name Poletown.35 Its population had
declined by 1980 and over half of its residents were non-white at the time
of the case.36 A Detroit News article described the neighborhood's
conditions as follows, "The old workingmen's houses, once solid, were
losing mortar or siding. Blight was already driving residents north in the
city to Warren and Sterling Heights." '37
Mayor Young proposed the Poletown site and GM agreed to build its
combined plant on the site, if the property could be assembled for
construction within eighteen months.38 "Many homeowners agreed at the
outset to sell their homes to the city and leave their crumbling
neighborhood., 39 However, some owners did not sell. "Buyout prices for
the homes started at $6,000 and averaged $13,000. Residents received an
31. See generally, CITY OFDETROIT DEPT. REPORT ANDINFO. COMM, DETROIT:. THE
NEW CITY, SUMMARY REPORT DETROIT CMTY. RENEWAL PROGRAM (1966).
32.Id.
33. Id.
34.Id.
35. JEANIE WYLIE, POLETOWN COMMUNITY BETRAYED, 65 (1989).
36. Mayor Young testified that the characterof Poletown had changed dramatically in
recent times as the area became integrated, and that the area should more properly be
designated as "Afro-Poletown." Brief of Appellees in Response to Application for Leave to
Appeal Prior to a Decision by the Court of Appeals at Tr-IV-46-47; App. 94-95, Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, No. 66294 (Mich. S. Ct. Dec. 31, 1980) (on file with
author). Over half of the residents of the area were non-white. Id. at Ex. 5 at IV-24; App.
157. See generally Poletown, 304 N.W.2d 455. Speculation arose within the community at
the time and the belief persists today among some white critics that Mayor Young, an
African-American, cooperated with GM in the Poletown project to wipe out a European
ethnic community in retaliation for the white leadership of Detroit clearing African-
American neighborhoods in the early days of Detroit's urban renewal and interstate highway
construction programs. See State Supreme Court Must Reverse Poletown Decision,
OAKLAND PRESS, available at http://theoaklandpress.com/stories/050204/
opi20040502006.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2006).
37. Jenny Nolan, Auto Plant v. Neighborhood: The Poletown Battle, DET. NEWS,
available at http://info.detnews.com/history/story/index.cfm?i d= 18&category=
business.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2005).
38.Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 460 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting), 467 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
39. See generally Nolan, supra note 37.
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additional grant of up to $15,000 to buy replacement homes, and another
grant of $3,500 was available for moving costs." Detroit used its eminent
domain authority under the state's Economic Development Corporation Act
to take the property of landowners who refused to sell.4' The Act declares
that
[t]here exists in this state the continuing need for programs to
alleviate and prevent conditions of unemployment, and that it is
accordingly necessary to assist and retain local industrial and
commercial enterprises . . . to strengthen and revitalize the
economy of this state and its municipalities .... Therefore, the
powers granted in this act constitute the performance of essential
public purposes and functions for this state and its municipalities. 2
The Michigan Supreme Court, by deciding Poletown in 1981, became
the first court in the nation to address the legitimacy of using of the power
of eminent domain "to alleviate and prevent conditions of
unemployment."' Although the opposing landowners conceded that the
project furthered the public purpose of retaining local industries, they
argued that the transfer of their property to GM did not constitute a "public
use" of the power, as required by article X, section 2 of the Michigan
Constitution of 1963. In addressing the landowners' argument, the court
concluded that the terms "public use" and "public purpose" had been used
interchangeably in Michigan eminent domain cases "in an effort to describe
the protean concept of public benefit."' It recognized that the United States
Supreme Court's holding in Berman v. Parker,45 decided twenty-seven
years earlier, defined the meaning of "public use" under the Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as synonymous with public purpose.46
Like Berman, the Poletown court accorded deference to the legislature by
holding that when the legislature has determined that governmental action
of the type contemplated meets a public need and serves an essential public
40. Id. See Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property AcquisitionAct of 1970,
42 U.S.C.S. § 4601 (2005).
41. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 457.
42. Economic Development Corporations Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.1602
(West 2005).
43. See generally supra note 18.
44. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 458. See In re City of Center Line, 196 N.W.2d 144
(Mich. 1972); Gregory Marina, Inc. v. City ofDetroit, 144 N.W.2d 503 (Mich. 1966); In re
Slum Clearance in City of Detroit, 50 N.W.2d 340 (Mich. 1951).
45. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
46.Id. at 31-32.
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purpose, the court's role is "limited." Unlike Berman, however, the
Poletown court did not accept the legislature's determination as
"conclusive."' 7
Significantly, the limited role described by the Poletown court did not
signal the court's abandonment of its judicial prerogative. The court
specifically found that the benefits to the public were primary and those to
a private interest (General Motors) merely incidental.4 1 It also determined
that a "public necessity" for the taking existed based upon the city's
presentation of "substantial evidence of the severe economic conditions
facing the residents of the city and state, the need for new industrial
development to revitalize local industries, the economic boost the proposed
project would provide, and the lack of other adequate available sites to
implement the project., 49 Accordingly, the "public use" components of
primary benefit to the public and "public necessity" were present in
Poletown and, while the case was controversial and not easy, the
47.Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 458. The majority in Poletown quoted the languageofthe
U.S. Supreme Court in Berman, 348 U.S. at 32, with respect to interpreting "public use" in
the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution that "when a legislature speaks, the public
interest has been declared in terms 'well-nigh conclusive."' Id. at 459. The Poletown court
did not say, however, as did the Berman court, that it viewed the legislature's determination
of"public use" as conclusive. Id. Nor did it reject the principle that whether a taking is for
public or private use in Michigan is a question for the court. If the Poletown court viewed
the legislature's determination as conclusive, its opinion need not have included findings by
the court that the private benefits to GM were incidental and a public necessity existed for
the taking. Id. Moreover, the court would not have stated that, "[w]here, as here, the
condemnation power is exercised in a way that benefits specific and identifiable private
interests, a court inspects with heightened scrutiny the claim that the public interest is the
predominant interest being advanced." Id. at 459-60. While the Poletown majority grants
deference to the policy of the legislature, expressed in the Economic Development
Corporation Act, that projects under the Act "shall be considered necessary for public
purposes and for the benefit of the public," the court clearly does not state that it is bound
by them. Id. at 461. Justice Fitzgerald in his dissent concedes, "It is undeniable that such
legislative pronouncements are entitled to great deference." Id. at 461 (Fitzgerald, J.,
dissenting). Justice Ryan, on the other hand, engages in a misguided reading of Michigan
law in his dissent when he concludes that "it has always been the case that this Court has
accorded little or no weight to legislative determination of 'public use."' Id at 474 (Ryan,
J.,dissenting). Justice Ryan's position has no support in Michigan takings jurisprudence or
the writings of Justice Cooley, who stated "the question of what is apublic use is always one
of law. Deference will be paid to the legislative judgment, as expressed in enactments
providing for an appropriation of property, but will not be conclusive." THOMAS M.
COOLEY, CONSTUruTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 666 (5th ed. 1998)(1883). TheHathcock court, in
rendering its opinion, adopted the flawed reasoning of Justice Ryan in his Poletown dissent,
providing a simplistic approach to overruling Poletown, which it appears the court was
seeking from the outset.
48. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 459.
49. Id.
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condemnation was consistent with Michigan takings jurisprudence and in
no way an abuse of the eminent domain power under Michigan law.
The justices in Poletown were sharply divided on the issue to be
addressed in the case. Chief Justice Coleman together with Justices Moody,
Levin, Kavanagh, and Williams comprised the majority, while Justices
Fitzgerald and Ryan dissented. Justice Fitzgerald dissented on the basis that
"[t]he condemnation contemplated in the present action goes beyond the
scope of the power of eminent domain in that it takes private property for
privateuse."50 Similarly, Justice Ryan found that "the central jurisprudential
issue is the right of government to expropriate property from those who do
not wish to sell for the use and benefit of a strictly private corporation."'"
In contrast, the majority's focus was upon the benefits to the public:
Can a municipality use the power of eminent domain granted to it
by the Economic Development Corporations Act... to condemn
property for transfer to a private corporation to build a plant to
promote industry and commerce, thereby adding jobs and taxes to
the economic base of the municipality and state?52
IV. THE HATHCOCKCASE
Unlike Poletown, where the private market for large economic
development projects was virtually nonexistent and local unemployment
was at record levels, Hathcock arose in an area of burgeoning growth
surrounding the recently expanded Detroit Metropolitan Airport, one of the
busiest airports in the nation.53 The expansion of the airport raised concerns
that the noise from increased air traffic would plague neighboring
landownersO In an effort to obviate the problem, Wayne County used a
partial grant from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to begin a
program of purchasing neighboring properties through negotiated sales.5
A checkerboard pattern of lots, with an area totaling five hundred acres, was
acquired in close proximity to the airport. 6 The county's agreement with
the FAA required that property purchased through the noise abatement
50. Id. at 464 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 471 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 457.
53. See Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport, available at
http://www.clearchannelairports.comnmarkets/detroit.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2006).
54. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 770-71.
55. Id.
56.Id.
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program be put to economically productive use. 7 In order to comply with
the mandate, the county proposed to develop a multi-purpose technology
park, comprised of business and research space, a conference center, hotel
accommodations and a recreational facility on 1,300 acres."
Using its own funds, the county purchased an additional five hundred
acres, leaving it three hundred acres short of the amount of land it needed
to begin the project. 9 The county then commenced condemnation
proceedings to acquire the remaining forty-six parcels needed to fully
assemble the planned site.60 The properties were appraised and written
offers made to the remaining landowners, in accordance with the
requirements of Michigan's Uniform Condemnation Procedures Act.6'
Twenty-seven more property owners accepted the county's offers, leaving
nineteen properties subject to a taking through eminent domain. 62 These
remaining landowners argued that the taking was not for a "public use" and
requested that the court overturn the Poletown decision.63
The county maintained that the taking served a "public purpose" and
based upon the principles of Poletown constituted a "public use" of the
county's power of eminent domain under article X, section 2 of the
Michigan Constitution.64 According to the county, the project would create
57. Id.
58. Id.
59.Id.
60. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 771.
61. MCH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 213.51 (West 1980).
62. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 771.
63. The Hathcock property owners apparently had little interest in using the Poletown
holdingtoprotect theirproperty rights. Theprevailing economic conditions in the two cases
were markedly different and, accordingly, the Poletown principles may well have inured to
their benefit. In Poletown, the unemployment levels in Detroit were near those of the Great
Depression in the 1930s, while in Hathcock, the purpose of the taking was to accelerate
growth in an economically prosperous local area. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 770. Unlike
Poletown, Hathcock did not involve an attempt to alleviate impacted local unemployment
or to reverse a precipitous economic decline within the community. In reaching its holding,
the Poletown court stated, "If the public benefit was not so clear and significant, we would
hesitate to sanction approval of such a project." 304 N.W.2d at 459. The author maintains
that "public use" in an eminent domain proceeding in Michigan requires (1) providing for
a "public necessity" and (2) primarily benefitting the public with no more than incidental
benefits to a private entity. Clearly, if the property were not needed in Hathcock to complete
the project, as later conceded by the county, nopublic necessity would exist. See Joel Kurth,
County Vows to Move on Tech Park, DET. NEWS, available at http://www.detroitnews.com
(last visited Jan. 23, 2006). Conceivably, the court could find also that the use of eminent
domain to promote economic growth under the circumstances of Hathcock, rather than to
reverse an economic decline as in Poletown, would not meet the "public necessity"
requirement, even if the property were needed to complete the project.
64. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 770.
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thousands of jobs, broaden the county's tax base from industrial to a
mixture of industrial, technology, and service uses, creating tens of millions
of dollars in tax revenue. The Hathcock court found that the taking was
necessary for public purposes.65
Notwithstanding findings by the Hathcock court that the county's
takings were (1) necessary for public purposes,66 (2) within the scope of the
county's powers,67 and (3) for the use or benefit of the public under the
Economic Development Corporation Act,68 the court held that the takings
were unconstitutional, overruling Poletown. The court stated, "In this case,
Wayne County intends to transfer the condemned properties to private
parties in a manner wholly inconsistent with the common understanding of
'public use' at the time our Constitution was ratified."69 In explaining its
position the court reasoned:
Because Poletown's conception of a public use-that of
'alleviating unemployment and revitalizing the economic base of
the community'-has no support in the Court's eminent domain
jurisprudence before the Constitution's ratification, its
interpretation of 'public use' in article X, section 2 cannot reflect
the common understanding of that phrase among those
sophisticated in the law at ratification. Consequently, the Poletown
analysis provides no legitimate support for the condemnation
proposed in this case and, for the reasons stated above, is
overruled.70
Having erroneously concluded that Michigan takings jurisprudence
prohibits the use of eminent domain for economic development purposes
under any circumstance, the court in Hathcock did not assess the extent of
the "necessity" present or the degree of the public benefit to be derived.
Immediately after the Hathcock court's decision, Wayne County
announced that it was proceeding with the project without the nineteen
parcels that were the subject of the condemnation. 7' Eminent domain was
being used by the county for public convenience and not "public necessity,"
65. Id. at 775-79.
66.Id. at 777.
67. Id. at 776.
68. Id. at 776.
69. Id. at 770.
70. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 787.
71. See Kurth, supra note 63. By contrast, accomplishing the project in Poletown
without using eminent domain would have been impossible, and no neighborhood property
had been acquired prior to commencement of condemnation.
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as that term has been interpreted by the court.
V. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Introduction
The Hathcock court has described Justice Cooley as "our patron saint,"
but neither Cooley's opinions nor his treatise support the Hathcock holding
overruling Poletown.72 Cooley is widely recognized as one of the leading
scholars and jurists of the 19th-century and served on the Michigan
Supreme Court from 1864 to 1885. 7' His work entitled "A Treatise on the
Constitutional Limitations which Rest upon the Legislative Power of the
States of the American Union" was first published in 1868 and soon became
universally recognized as an authoritative source for interpreting state
constitutional law within the federal system of the United States.74 Cooley's
72. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 779.
73. See Thomas McIntyre Cooley, available at www.cooley.edu/overview/
tmctheman.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2005).
74. Cooley's work entitled "A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations which Rest
upon the Legislative Power of the State of the American Union" was published in eight
editions, with the first appearing in 1868. William J. Fleener, Jr., Michigan Lawyers In
History-Thomas McIntyre Cooley: Michigan 's Most Influential Lawyer, available at
http://www.michbar.org/joumal/article.cfm?articlelD=53&volumelD=3 (last visited Jan. 23,
2006). The eighth edition was published in 1927, twenty nine years after his death in 1898.
THOMAS M. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (8th ed. 1927). Justice Cooley himself
exercised editorial and content control over only the first five editions. THOMAS M. COOLEY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (6th ed. 1890)(1883). Accordingly, all references to the
words of Cooley himself in this article are referenced to the fifth edition. See COOLEY,supra
note 47. Thereafter, the cases, content, andvolume of the work were expanded significantly
by others without his oversight. In the preface to the sixth edition (1890), Cooley writes:
The period that has elapsed since the last preceding edition of this work was
published, has been prolific in Constitutional questions, and a new edition seems
therefore important. The official duties of the author putting it out of his power to
perform in person the necessary labor, the services of Mr. Alexis C. Angell of the
Detroit bar were secured for the purpose, and by him the edition now offered to
thepublic has been prepared. Mr. Angell has examined all the new cases, making
use of them so far as seemed important, and adding to the references till the whole
number now reaches over ten thousand. Where it seemed necessary, the text has
been changed and added to.
THOMAS M. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (6th ed. 1890). Copyrights for the
work were issued to Justice Cooley through 1896, two years before his death. Thereafter
they were issued to one of his two sons, either Thomas B. Cooley (in 1903, 1906, and 1910)
or Charles H. Cooley (in 1917, 1919, and 1927). Thomas B. Cooley was not a lawyer, but
apediatrician, and Charles H. Cooleya professor of sociology at the University of Michigan.
See Thomas Benton Cooley, available at http://www.whonamedit.com/doctor.cfin-
1931.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2006); Charles Horton Cooley, available at
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treatise provides a comprehensive analysis of state constitutional law among
the states in the latter half of the 19th-century and does not exclusively
address Michigan constitutional law. The great majority of cases analyzed
and discussed by Cooley in his treatise are from other states.
However, as a member of the Michigan Supreme Court during the same
period, Justice Cooley authored opinions in landmark Michigan
constitutional law cases, including four important to Michigan takings
jurisprudence: The Detroit andHowellRailroad Co. v. The Township Board
of Salem,76 People ex rel Trombly v. Auditor-General,7 Andrew McClary
v. Benjamin Hartwell,78 and Martin Ryerson v. Harrison J. Brown.79
Justice Cooley has described the power of eminent domain as:
[T]he rightful authority which exists in every sovereignty to control
and regulate those rights of a public nature which pertain to its
citizens in common, and to appropriate and control individual
property for the public benefit, as the public safety, necessity,
convenience and welfare may demand. The authority springs from
no contract or arrangement between the government and the citizen
whose property may be appropriated, but it has its foundation in the
imperative law of necessity ... The right being thus found to rest
upon necessity, the power to appropriate in any case must be
justified and limited by the necessity."0
Accordingly, the principle is well accepted that the legislature may
authorize the use of eminent domain to provide for a "public necessity,"
http://socsci.colorado.edu/SOC/Sl/si-cooley-bio.htm (lastvisited Jan. 23, 2006). The eighth
and final edition of the Treatise (1927) was compiled by Walter Carrington, a member of
the MarylandBar. THOMAS M. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONALLIMITATIONS, 33(8th ed. 1927).
By then, it had grown to be a two volume work andwas no longer limited to the analysis and
words of Justice Cooley by any standard. In citing Cooley's treatise, the Hathcock court
freely and arbitrarily shifts from the 8th edition of the work to the 5th edition and back again
to the 8th edition. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 779, 789-92, 797-99.
75. For example, with respect to the statement, "The right of eminent domain, it has
been said, 'does not imply a right in the sovereign power to take the property of one citizen
and transfer it to another, even for a full compensation, where the public interest will be in
no way promoted by such transfer."' COOLEY, supra note 47, at 657 n.2. None of the
eighteen cases cited by Justice Cooley to support this principle are from Michigan.Id.
76. People ex rel. Detroit & H.R. Co. v. Salem Twp. Bd., 20 Mich. 452 (1870).
77. People ex rel. Trombley v. Humphrey, 23 Mich. 471 (1871).
78. McClary v. Hartwell, 25 Mich. 139 (1872).
79. Ryerson, 35 Mich. 333.
80. Salem Twp. Bd., 20 Mich. at 474.
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subject to limitations contained in the state constitution."'
Provisions covering the use of eminent domain in Michigan are
contained in the Northwest Ordinance of 178782 and the Michigan
Constitutions of 1835,83 1850,' 4 1908,85 and 1963.6 Michigan courts have
consistently interpreted all five charters as limiting the exercise of the
power to a "public use."" The language in the documents themselves
creating the "public use" limitation, however, has varied from "public
exigencies make it necessary, for the common preservation" (Northwest
Ordinance), to "public use" (Constitutions of 1835 and 1963) and "use or
benefit of the public" (Constitutions of 1850 and 1908). Notwithstanding
these distinct wording differences, Michigan courts have not drawn any
distinction in the interpretation ofthese separate expressions, indicating that
the term "public use" broadly encompasses eminent domain actions
generating a "public benefit." Moreover, Michigan eminent domain cases
draw virtually no distinction between the terms "public use" and "public
necessity." These decisions are consistent with the conclusion of Justice
Cooley with respect to the meaning of "public use": "[I]t must be conceded
that the term 'public use,' as employed in the law of eminent domain, has
a meaning much more controlled by the necessity, and somewhat different
from that which it bears generally."88
81. COOLEY, supra note 47, at 55.
82. 1787 Gov't of Northwest Territory art. II.
83. MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. I, § 19.
84. MICH. CONST. of 1850, art. XV, § 9 and art. XVIII, § 14.
85. MICH. CONST. of 1908, art. XIII, §§ 1,5.
86. MICH. CONST. of 1963, art. X, § 2.
87. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d 455; Shizas, 52 N.W.2d 589; In re Slum Clearance, 50
N.W.2d 340 (Mich. 1951); Ryerson, 35 Mich. 333; Swan v. Williams, 2 Mich. 427 (1852).
88. CoOLEY, supra note 47, at 665. Historically, three different interpretations of
"public use" can be discerned from early case law among the states: (1) the government
must hold title to the property after condemnation, (2) the condemned property is accessible
to the public as a matter of right and (3) the condemnation results in a public benefit or
advantage. See generally Lawrence Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent
Domain, 57 OR. L. REV. 203, 204-25 (1978); Errol E. Meidinger, The "Public Uses" of
EminentDomain: History and Policy, 11 ENVTL. L. 1, 4-41 (1980); Philip Nichols, Jr., The
Meaning of Public Use in Law of Eminent Domain, 20 B.U. L. REV. 615 (1940). The
widespread willingness of states to support federally funded slum clearance and low income
housing beginning inthe 1930s under theNational Industrial Recovery Act, followed bythe
Housing Acts of 1937 and 1949, largely eliminated categories one and two. Id. Michigan
caselaw places thestate's interpretation of"public use"inthe third category, consistent with
theMichigan Constitutions of 1850 and 1908 describing the limitation as including "public
use or benefit." Id.
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B. Northwest Ordinance
The U.S. Congress adopted the Northwest Ordinance 9 in 1787. The
Ordinance contained the clause that:
[N]o man shall be deprived of his liberty or property, but by the
judgment of his peers or the law of the land, and that should the
public exigencies make it necessary, for the common preservation,
to take any person's property, or to demand his particular service,
full compensation should be made for the same.90
The Michigan Supreme Court in the early 19th-century case of Swan v.
Williams interpreted the phrase "public exigencies make it necessary, for
the common preservation" as describing the Michigan territorial
government's "right to take private property for public use, whenever the
public necessities or convenience demand it."' Swan involved the
constitutionality of an act that authorized a private railroad company to
appropriate private property for the purpose of constructing and maintaining
a rail line.
92
C. Constitution of 1835
Michigan achieved statehood in 1837 and, thereafter, for more than a
decade was governed by the Constitution of 1835. 9 Article I, section 19 of
the constitution provided: "The property of no person shall be taken for
public use, without just compensation therefor." With respect to this
language, the Michigan Supreme Court has stated: "This is substantially the
language of the like provision of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution, and of the Constitutions of nearly all of the states."'94 It is
substantially the language also of article X, section 2 of the Constitution of
1963?
5
89. 1787 Gov't of Northwest Territory art. II.
90. Id.
91. Swan, 2 Mich. at 427.
92. Id.
93. MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. I, §19.
94. Hendershott v. Rogers, 211 N.W. 905, 906 (Mich. 1927).
95. MICH. CONST. of 1963, art. X, § 2.
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D. Constitution of 1850
The takings provisions were contained in article XVIII, sections 2 and
14 of the Constitution of 1850.96 Section 2 refers for the first time to "use
or benefit," while section 14 references only "use"; section 2 states:
When private property is taken for the use or benefit of the public,
the necessity for using such property and the just compensation to
be made therefore, except when to be made by the state, shall be
ascertained by a jury of twelve freeholders, residing in the vicinity
of such property, or by not less than three commissioners,
appointed by a court of record, as shall be prescribed by law:
Provided, the foregoing provision shall in no case be construed to
apply to the action of commissioners of highways in the official
discharge of their duty as highway commissioners. 7
Section 14 states:
The property of no person shall be taken for public use without just
compensation therefore. Private roads may be opened in the
manner to be prescribed by law; but in every case the necessity of
the road and the amount of all damages to be sustained by the
opening thereof shall be first determined by a jury of freeholders;
and such amount, together with the expenses of proceedings, shall
be paid by the person or persons to be benefitted. 98
E. Constitution of 1908
The Constitution of 1908 contained the provisions in article XIII,
sections 1 and 2.99 Reversing the order of the provisions contained in the
Constitution of 1950, section 2 refers also to a taking for the "use or
benefit' of the public.
Section 1 of the Constitution of 1908 states:
Private property shall not be taken by the public nor by any
corporation for public use, without the necessity therefore being
first determined and just compensation therefore being first made
96. MICH. CONST. of 1850, art. XVIII, §§ 2, 14.
97. MCH. CONST. of 1850, art. XVIII, § 2 (emphasis added).
98. MICH. CONST. of 1850, art. XVIII, § 14.
99. MICH. CONST. of 1908, art. XIII, §§ 1, 2.
1348 [Vol. 51:1331
2005] UNPRECEDENTED OVERRULING OF POLETOWN
or secured in such manner as shall be prescribed by law. 00
Section 2 states:
When private property is taken for the use or benefit of the public,
the necessity for using such property and the just compensation to
be made therefore, except when to be made by the state, shall be
ascertained by a jury of twelve freeholders residing in the vicinity
of such property, or by not less than three commissioners appointed
by a court of record, as shall be prescribed by law: Provided, that
the foregoing provision shall not be construed to apply to the action
of commissioners of highways or road commissioners in the
official discharge of their duties.'0 '
F. Constitution of 1963
As described earlier, article X, section 2 of the Constitution of 1963,
which governs Hathcock and Poletown, contains the provision: "Private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation
therefor being first made or secured in a manner prescribed by law."'0 2 The
simplified language harkens back to the language of article 1, section 19 of
the Constitution of 1835103 and to the language of the Fifth Amendment of
the United States Constitution.3 4
While the Constitution of 1835 referred to "public use," the
Constitutions of 1850 and 1908 replaced the words "public use" with "use
or benefit of the public" and, in addition, included the requirement that a
jury of twelve freeholders or three commissioners appointed by the court
determine the necessity for the taking.0 5 The appointment of a jury or
commissioners to determine necessity was incorporated into the constitution
to prevent private property from being taken from one person for the private
benefit of another.10 6
Necessity has always been a constitutional requirement in Michigan for
the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Under the Constitution of
1835, determination of necessity was a legislative prerogative. However,
100. MICH. CONST. of 1908, art. XIII, § 1.
101. MICH. CONST. of 1908, art. XIII, § 2 (emphasis added).
102. MICH. CONST. of 1963, art. X, § 2.
103. MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. I, § 19.
104. U.S. CONST. amend V.
105. Hendershott v. Rogers, 211 N.W. 905, 906-07 (Mich. 1927).
106. Paul v. City of Detroit, 32 Mich. 108, 113 (1875).
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drafters of the Constitution of 1850 found that the system was being abused
by legislatures and persons or corporations whom they authorized to use the
power of eminent domain to oppress individuals by "corruption and
bargaining."'' 7 As a result, the Constitution of 1850, followed later by the
Constitution of 1908, shifted the determination of necessity from a
legislative responsibility to a judicial one. Only a few other states followed
this approach.' 08
During the period from 1850 until 1963 the terms "necessity" and"use"
became cohesive in Michigan takings case law. Without exception, the
court upheld eminent domain when it was satisfied that a public necessity
existed and a taking primarily benefitted the public with no more than
incidental private benefits.'0 9 Although Justice Cooley employed the terms
"use" and "necessity" separately on occasion, he drew no distinction
between the two when he found the public benefit requirement to be
satisfied."0
The Constitution of 1963 deletes any reference to a court appointed jury
or commission being responsible for determining necessity for a taking."'
Minutes of the Eminent Domain Committee of the Constitutional
Convention indicate that late in its session, members elected to simplify the
language of the "public use" limitation in the constitution to parallel once
again the wording of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution."12 The
requirement to convene a judicial tribunal to determine necessity was
eliminated. 13 The effect is to return the eminent domain provision to
wording nearly identical to the "public use" provision of the Constitution
of 1835, which the court in Paul v. City of Detroit described as opening the
107. Id. at 114.
108. "The constitutions of some of the States require the question of the necessity of
any specific appropriation to be submitted to a jury; and this requirement cannot be
dispensed with." COOLEY, supra note 47, at 668 n.3.
109. See generally supra notes 11-12 and accompanying cases.
110. Cooley stated:
The reason of the case and the settled practice of free govermnents must
be our guides in determining what is or is not to be regarded a public
use; and that only can be considered such where the government is
supplying its own needs, or is furnishing facilities for its citizens in
regard to those matters of public necessity, convenience, or welfare,
which, on account of their peculiar character, and the
difficulty-perhaps impossibility-of making provision for them
otherwise, it is a, like proper, useful, and needful for the government to
provide.
COOLEY, supra note 47, at 668 n.3.
111. MICH. CONST. of 1963, art. X, § 2.
112. Constitutional Convention Record, at 2846-48.
113. Id.
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door to private exploitation of the power of eminent domain. 114 It is
understandable, then, that the court would continue to maintain some
prerogative over potential abuses of eminent domain by the legislature and
local municipalities after the Constitution of 1963 was ratified. The vehicle
for maintaining judicial oversight and holding abuses of the eminent
domain in check is the "public use" limitation.
VI. "PUBLIC USE"
Two distinct words comprise the term "public use" which defines the
constitutional limitation on the power of the legislature to authorize the use
of eminent domain: "public" and "use."" 5 The legislature has the sovereign
power to use eminent domain for a public purpose. Article X, section 2 of
the Constitution of 1963 requires that the public purpose constitute a
"public use." ' 1 6 A line of Michigan cases dating back more than a century
subscribe to the principle that a "public use" exists when the taking (1)
primarily benefits the public with merely incidental private benefits and (2)
provides for a public necessity.'
A. Public
Michigan cases have uniformly held that the use is "public" when it
primarily benefits the public and private benefits are merely incidental."'
The power of eminent domain has never been limited to acquiring property
solely for the state or one of its governmental units." 9 From the earliest use
of eminent domain in Michigan, private individuals and corporations have
been eligible to receive condemned property to provide for a public
necessity when they can best accomplish the public good. 2
114. Paul, 32 Mich. 108.
115. MICH. CONST. of 1963, art. X, § 2.
116. Id.
117. See Toldsdorfv. Griffith, 626 N.W.2d 163 (Mich. 2001); City of Lansing v.
Edward Rose Realty, Inc., 502 N.W.2d 638 (Mich. 1993); Shizas v. City of Detroit, 52
N.W.2d 589 (Mich. 1952); Berrien Springs Water-Power Co. v. Berrien Circuit Judge, 94
N.W.2d379(Mich. 1903); Bd. of Health ofPortage Township v. Van Hoesen, 49 N.W. 894
(Mich. 1891); Ryerson v. Brown, 35 Mich. 333 (1877). See also Mansfield, Coldwater &
Lake Mich. R.R. Co. v. Clark, 23 Mich 33 (1871).
118. See generally id.
119. Swan, 2 Mich. 427.
120. Justice Cooley did not even rule out the exercise of eminent domain when the
benefits to the public were not primary, if the power were used for a public necessity: "We
are not disposed to say that incidental benefits to the public could not under any
circumstances justify an exercise of the right of eminent domain."Ryerson, 35 Mich. at 339.
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In the seminal case of Swan v. Williams, decided in 1852, the Michigan
Supreme Court held that a "public use" existed when the legislature
authorized a railroad corporation to take private property to construct its rail
lines.' Justice Cooley in his treatise explained the rationale for such a
holding as based upon the sovereign's need to provide for a public
necessity:
And while there are unquestionably some objections to compelling
a citizen to surrender his property to a corporation, whose
corporators, in receiving it, are influenced by motives of private
gain and emolument, so that to them the purpose of the
appropriation is altogether private, yet conceding it to be settled
that these facilities for travel and commerce are a public necessity,
if the legislature, reflecting the public sentiment, decide [sic] that
the general benefit is better promoted by their construction through
individuals or corporations than by the State itself, it would clearly
be pressing a constitutional maxim to an absurd extreme if it were
to be held that the public necessity should only be provided for in
the way which is least consistent with the public interest.
Accordingly, on the principle of public benefit, not only the State
and its political divisions, but also individuals and corporate
bodies, have been authorized to take private property for the
construction of works of public utility, and when duly empowered
by the legislature so to do, their private pecuniary interest does not
preclude their being regarded as public agencies in respect to the
public good which is sought to be accomplished.'22
The Hathcock court artificially and mistakenly limited the type of
persons or corporations that may provide for a public necessity to
"instrumentalities of commerce."'23 All other persons and corporations are
However, no examples exist in Michigan takingsjurisprudence ofthe use ofeminent domain
being upheld when the court found that the public benefit was merely incidental.
121. Swan, 2 Mich. 427.
122. COOLEY, supra note 47, at 667-68.
123. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 781-85. The requirement that when eminent domain is
used to acquire property for transfer to a private person or corporation for public necessity,
theentity must be an "instrumentalit[y] of commerce," was first described in Michigan case
law as a formal limitation by Justice Ryan in his dissenting opinion in Poletown. 304
N.W.2d at 475-76 (Ryan, J., dissenting). Justice Ryan's proposition is contrary to the
teachings and holdings of Justice Cooley, which do not limit the eligibility to receive
condemned property to a closed class of private persons or corporations when a public
necessity exists. As stated by Cooley:
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excluded. With the exception of Justice Ryan in his Poletown dissent, no
other justice or scholar had previously drawn such a bright line distinction
in providing for a public necessity, including Justice Cooley in his
We find ourselves somewhat at sea, however, when we undertake to define, in the
light of the judicial decisions, what constitutes a public use. It has been said by a
learned jurist that, "if the public interest can be in anyway promoted by the taking
of private property, it must rest in the wisdom of the legislature to determine
whether the benefit to the public will be of sufficient importance to render it
expedient for them to exercise the right of eminent domain, and to authorize an
interference with the private rights of individuals for that purpose. It is upon this
principle that the legislatures of several of the States have authorized the
condemnation of the lands of individuals for mill sites, where from the nature of
the country such mill sites could not be obtained for the accommodation of the
inhabitants without overflowing the lands thus condemned. Upon the same
principle of public benefit, not only the agents of the government, but also
individuals and corporate bodies, have been authorized to take private property for
the purpose of making public highways, turnpike roads, and canals; of erecting
and constructing wharves and basins; of establishing ferries; of draining swamps
and marshes; and of bringing water to cities and villages. In all such cases the
object of the legislative grant of power is the public benefit derived from the
contemplated improvement, whether such improvement is to be effected directly
by the agents of the government, or through the medium of corporate bodies, or
of individual enterprises." It would not be entirely safe, however, to apply with
much liberality the language above quoted, that, "where thepublic interest can be
in any way promoted by the taking of private property," the taking can be
considered for a public use ... The reason of the case and the settled practice of
free governments must be our guides in determining what is or is not to be
regarded a public use; ....
COOLEY,supra note 47, at 659-60. Justice Cooley's rejection of the use of eminent domain
to acquire property for mill dams in Ryerson v. Brown was based upon his conclusion that
no public necessity existed for the use of the power and mill dams frequently constituted
public nuisances in 19th century America, not that they failed to constitute an
"instrumentality of commerce." Ryerson, 35 Mich. at 337-40. With regard to the lack of a
showing of local necessity and the need that the private entity be an "instrumentality of
commerce," Cooley explained, "[i]fthe act were limited in its scope to manufactures which
areof local necessity, as grist-mills are in a new country not yet penetrated by railroads, the
question would be somewhat different from what it is now." Id.
It is natural to assume that any new manufacturing establishment will be
advantageous in the community; and in a general sense, if there were no
drawbacks, this would be true; but the drawbacks are often so serious that it
becomes a public nuisance. It would be a singular, but by no means impossible,
result of the condemnation of lands for a mill-dam, to find the dam itself
condemned and ordered removed as a nuisance. That mill-dams often are
nuisances, is not only well known, but the prosecutions for such nuisances make
the fact a familiar one in our jurisprudence. Where the country is level, as is the
case with a considerable part of this state, the danger that they will become
nuisances is particularly great.
Id. at 341.
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nineteenth-century landmark decision of Ryerson v. Brown .124 To
paraphrase Justice Cooley in the context of the Poletown case, if it were
found in Poletown that "alleviating unemployment" were apublic necessity,
"it would clearly be pressing a constitutional maxim to an absurd extreme"
to hold that the state should use its political subdivisions to add workers to
alleviate employment, if a major manufacturing corporation is better able
to provide increased employment for the public good.125 With respect to the
presence of the public necessity to alleviate unemployment in Poletown,
Justice Ryan in his Poletown dissent described economic and
unemployment conditions in the City of Detroit as grave: "While
unemployment is high throughout the nation, it is of calamitous proportions
throughout the state of Michigan, and particularly in the City of Detroit,
whose economic lifeblood is the now foundering automobile industry. It is
difficult to overstate the magnitude of the crisis. 126
Justice Ryan's "instrumentality of commerce" distinction is based upon
an unwarranted extrapolation from the narrow focus of eminent domain
cases decided during the nineteenth century. Like most states at the time,
the Michigan legislature authorized the use of eminent domain almost
exclusively to build and operate railroads, turnpikes, plank roads, bridges,
ferries, and canals. 127 These uses were widely accepted as public necessities
and shaped the early principles governing eminent domain law. The
principal exception among the states and in Michigan during this period
involved legislation authorizing private property to be taken to construct
mill dams, referred to in nineteenth-century America as manufactories.'
21
Twoprincipal mill dam cases came before the Michigan Supreme Court
during this early period: McClary v. Hartwell (1872)129 and Ryerson v.
Brown (1877). 130 Justice Cooley authored the opinions in both, which were
124. Justice Weaver's concurrence in the Hathcock opinion is highly critical of the
majority's categorization of Michigan eminent domain case law. She finds the approach
unsupportable by the State's taking jurisprudence and in conflict with the teachings of
Justice Cooley. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 795-96 (Weaver, J., concurring).
125. COOLEY, supra note 47, at 667-68.
126. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 465 (Ryan, J., dissenting)
127. The study entitled "The Michigan Constitution and Eminent Domain," by
Solomon Bienenfeld, was prepared for the Constitutional Convention Preparatory
Committee, State ofMichigan and determined that necessity to support eminent domain was
found in Michigan cases involving highways, schools, parks, airports, parking facilities,
slumclearance, low-cost housing, railroads, utilities, courts, administrative offices, jails, and
hospitals. SOLOMON BIENENFELD, THE MICHIGAN CONSTITUTION AND EMINENT DOMAIN
(1961).
128. COOLEY, supra note 47, at 662-66. See Ryerson, 35 Mich. 333.
129. 25 Mich. 139 (1872).
130. 35 Mich. 333 (1877).
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decided under the Constitution of 1850, requiring that when private
property is taken "for the use or benefit of the public," the necessity for
such taking shall be ascertained, by "a jury of twelve freeholders appointed
by a court of record.' 31 Each case involved taking property under "An Act
to encourage the erection and support of waterpower manufactories"
approved March 21, 1865, as amended. 132 It is perfectly clear from the
reasoning of the cases that Justice Cooley did not believe that a mill dam
had to be an "instrumentality of commerce" for its owner to use eminent
domain to assemble land for its construction. If that were his belief, Cooley
would have dismissed the mill dam cases out of hand. Instead, Cooley
focused upon whether the "public necessity" requirement was met in both
cases.
133
In McClary v. Hartwell, the commissioners found that the taking was
for a "public use," but made no specific finding with respect to "public
necessity."' 34 Cooley deemed this fatal. 135 He ruled: "The finding of the
necessity can not in any instance be dispensed with, nor can anything be
accepted as a substitute for it."'1 36 His opinion does not indicate that the mill
dam owner would be ineligible to receive condemned property, if a public
necessity were found.
Justice Cooley went further five years later in Ryerson v. Brown and
held that there was no public necessity within the state to support the act
itself. 37 He based his conclusion on two principal factors. First, he reviewed
the legislative history of legislative support for mill dams in Michigan.'38
Prior to Michigan achieving statehood in 1837, the Territorial Legislature
adopted an act in 1824 to authorize the use of eminent domain to
appropriate property to erect private dams for building mills for the grinding
of grain. 139 The act was repealed four years later, as steam power was
introduced into the Michigan economy to support mill and other
manufacturing operations.141 Cooley noted:
131. MICH. CONST. of 1850, art. XVIII, § 2.
132. 1864 Mich. Pub. Acts 651 (as amended at 1867 Mich. Pub. Acts 193).
133. McClary, 25 Mich. at 140; Ryerson, 33 Mich. at 333-39.
134. McClary, 25 Mich. at 139-40.
135. Id.
136.3d. at 140. Justice Cooley held further that: "This petitioner's machinery might be
taken and operated through State agents, but it would not be easy to suggest any reason of
necessity or policy for doing so."Id.
137. Ryerson, 35 Mich. at 338.
138. Id. at 334.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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The repeal of the act of 1824 and the neglect for more than forty
years to pass any other act of like character, afford weighty
evidence that whatever necessity might have been supposed to exist
for such legislation in very early days, had wholly passed away in
a very brief period. Nothing has occurred recently to create any
necessity which has not existed at every moment since the act of
1824 was repealed.'
41
Justice Campbell concurred by saying:
There is no public necessity for accomplishing unnecessary results.
The increase of settlements and the improvements in machinery are
constantly diminishing the old difficulties instead of increasing
them. The choice between steam and water power is now one
purely of private economy. The public can be supplied adequately
at all events, and the occasional refusal of individuals to sell the
right of flowage cannot drive any community into distress.'42
Second, Justice Cooley assessed the low level of demand for power in
the state at the time of the case and the potential for mill dams becoming a
public nuisance. According to Justice Cooley:
Numerous fine mill-sites in the populous counties of the state still
remain unimproved, not because of any difficulty in obtaining the
necessary permission to flow, but because the power is not in
demand. If the power were needed, the land would generally be
obtained on reasonable terms, except, perhaps, where there was
ground to believe a dam would become a nuisance; and in such
cases no permission to take lands, and no condemnation for mill
purposes, could protect the parties maintaining a dam against
prosecution for the public grievance.'43
141. Id.
142. Id. at 345-46 (Campbell, J., concurring).
143.Ryerson,33 Mich. at 337-38. Predictablyand ironically, Justice Cooley's holding
in Ryerson actually promoted economic development in Detroit and Michigan, which had
become a major steam engine center of the country. See The History of the Economy of
Detroit, available at http://www2.sisu.edu/faculty/watkins/detroit.htm (last visited Jan. 23,
2006). Steam engine technology andproduction rapidly expanded inDetroit during the three
decades following Michigan's statehood in 1837. Id. By 1840, Detroit had become a major
ship building center, where its shipyards built ocean-going cargo ships and were among the
first in the world to build steamships. Id. By the 1860's marine steam engines were a major
export from Detroit, andinventors were attracted to its steam power industry, notably Elijah
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Justice Ryan was mistakenly influenced, as well, by the court's
description in Swan v. Williams that private railroad corporations for which
eminent domain was exercised were essentially impressed with a "public
trust" responsibility.'" The Swan court was concerned that once the
legislature granted the power of eminent domain, the railroad would
exercise it for its own private benefit and not for the benefit of the public.
45
Since the legislature did not expressly impose a public trust obligation upon
the railroad, the court inferred one:
All this class of incorporations have been enacted upon the
hypothesis that the lands taken for these purposes were taken for
public use, and not for the private endowment, and it legitimately
follows that the tenure of the corporation is in the nature of a trust
for the public use, subject to the supervision of the government,
while its franchises are but consideration paid for the faithful
execution of this trust.146
Justice Cooley found the Swan court's reasoning to be spurious. He
concluded that there was no distinction between railroads and other private
businesses of the nineteenth century. 47 In People v. Salem, he wrote:
No principle was older, and none seemed better understood or more
inflexible, than that one man's property could not be taken under
the power of the government and transferred to another against the
will of the owner; but the State nevertheless is allowed to do so in
the case of railroads, under the guise of a convenient fiction, which
treats a corporation managing its own property for its own profit,
as merely a public convenience and agency. Nothing but an
overriding public necessity could ever have led the courts to this
judgment, for when the relations between the proprietors of a
railroad and the public are examined, we perceive at once that the
idea of agency in a legal sense is inadmissible. They are public
agents in the same sense that the proprietors of many other kinds of
McCoy, the African-American son of formerslaves. Id. In 1872 McCoyperfected in Detroit
a unique lubricating system for steam powered locomotives and manufacturing equipment.
Id. His invention reportedly led to the expression "the real McCoy" as describing his
technology. Justice Cooley's decision actually advanced this technology and the local steam
engine industry rather than disregarding it. Id.
144. Swan, 2 Mich. at 436.
145. Id. at 439-40.
146. Id.
147. Salem, 20 Mich. at 480.
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private business are, and not in any other or different sense.' 48
In Cooley's mind, public necessity was the determining factor in whether
a corporation could receive property acquired through eminent domain and
not the nature of the agent.
B. Use
In every Michigan case in which a "public necessity" has been found
to exist, the court has held that the "public use" requirement has been met,
so long as public benefits are primary and private benefits merely
incidental. Michigan decisions are consistent with the nineteenth-century
interpretation of "public use" by Justice Cooley: "[I]t must be conceded that
the term 'public use,' as employed in the law of eminent domain, has a
meaning much controlled by the necessity, and somewhat different from
that which it bears generally."' 49
The courts in Poletown and Hathcock have entertained a needless
debate with respect to whether "public use" and "public purpose" have the
same or different meanings in Michigan takings jurisprudence. This focus
on the use of terms, rather than on the settled reasoning of a long line of
Michigan eminent domain cases, obscures the fundamental importance of
the elements of "public necessity" and "public benefit" in the use of
eminent domain. Michigan courts have consistently sustained the exercise
of the power when they determine that the public necessity and public
benefit standards ingrained within the "public use" of requirement the state
constitution are satisfied.
The debate played significantly into the Poletown and Hathcock
decisions. The Poletown court drew no distinction between the terms "use"
and "purpose" in interpreting article X, section 2 of the Michigan
Constitution. On the other hand, the Hathcock decision overruling Poletown
turns on distinguishing the two terms. There is ample precedent in Michigan
case law for the Poletown court's position. The court stated: "We are
persuaded the terms have been used interchangeably in Michigan statutes
and decisions in an effort to describe the protean concept of public benefit.
The term 'public use' has not received a narrow or inelastic definition by
this Court in prior cases."'"5 The court's reasoning is reflective of the U.S.
148. Id.
149. COOLEY, supra note 47, at 664-65.
150. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 457. "Thehistoric distinction notwithstanding, it is clear
that the terms 'public use' and 'public purpose' have, indeed, been used interchangeably in
the inexact language of both eminent domain and taxation cases written by this Court." Id.
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Supreme Court's interpretation of the term "public use" contained in the
Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as described in Berman v.
Parker,151 Hawaii v. Midkiff 52 and, more recently, Kelo v. City of New
London.1 53 Moreover, eminent domain provisions of both the Michigan
Constitutions of 1850 and 1908 employ the language "public use or
benefit" supporting a broader interpretation ofthe "public use" limitation. 154
Neither the Hathcock nor Poletown courts adequately focused upon the
importance of "public necessity," although it was found to exist by the
Poletown court in arriving at its holding.' 5
Ironically, the Hathcock court could have ruled in favor of the
landowners based upon a clarification of the Poletown holding. The county
announced publicly immediately following the Hathcock decision that it
at 475 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (citing In re Slum Clearance, 50 N.W.2d 340, 343 (Mich.
1951); See also Hays v. City of Kalamazoo, 25 N.W.2d 787, 790 (Mich. 1947)).
151. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
152. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
153. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005).
154. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 465 (emphasis added). "The test of public use is not
based upon the function or capacity in which or bywhich the use is furnished. The right of
the public to receive and enjoy the benefit of the use determines whether the use is public
or private." Hays, 316 Mich. at 791.
More accurately, [eminentdomain] is the rightful authority, which exists in every
sovereignty, to control and regulate those rights of a public nature which pertain
to its citizens in common, and to appropriate and control individual property for
the public benefit, as the public safety, necessity, convenience or welfare may
demand.
COOLEY, supra note 47, at 649. Notably, eminent domain has been upheld by the court in
Michigan to acquire property to benefit low income housing tenants. As the court has
previously stated:
Through its several municipalities authorized to exercise it, the power of eminent
domain may be employed for the acquisition of property for the erection of
poorhouses for the care of those who are indigent or unable to care for themselves.
The legislation in question does not undertake to authorize the exercise of the
power of eminent domain for these purposes, but it does undertake to authorize
the exercise of the power of eminent domain for the purpose of acquiring lands,
not only for the purposes of slum-clearance, but for the construction of so-called
low-cost housing,-that is, for the purpose of erecting upon the lands so acquired
buildings which may be leased to persons with low incomes. Though we may not
agree with the economic reasoning lying back of the legislation, we are not
prepared to say that it violates any constitutional limitation of the State, is class
legislation, or denies to anyone the equal protection of the law.
In re Brewster StreetHousing Site in City of Detroit, 289 N.W. 493, 502 (Mich. 1939). See
alsoln re Edward J. Jeffries Homes Housing Project, City of Detroit, 11 N.W.2d 272 (Mich.
1943).
155. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 459.
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would proceed with the project without the land sought tobe condemned. 156
This leads to the conclusion that "public necessity" was lacking to support
ataking in Hathcock.157 As stated by Justice Campbell in Ryerson v. Brown,
which prohibited the use of eminent domain to capture water power after
steam power was available in Michigan, "There is no public necessity for
accomplishing unnecessary results., 15' However, it does not appear that the
Hathcock court gave any consideration to using the principles of Poletown
to protect the property owners whose land was being taken by the county.
All indications are that the court was determined to overrule Poletown in
furtherance of its own economic ideology.
The court's first step in overruling Poletown was to recast the case as
one designed to maximize the profits of General Motors. According to
Hathcock
[T]he Poletown majority concluded, for the first time in the history
of our eminent domain jurisprudence, that a generalized economic
benefit was sufficient under art. 10, § 2 to justify the transfer of
condemned property to a private entity. Before Poletown, we had
never held that a private entity's pursuit of profit was a "public
use" for constitutional takings purposes simply because one entity's
profit maximization contributed to the health of the general
economy.159
There is nothing in the record of Poletown that the profits of General
Motors would be maximized by building at the Poletown site rather than at
a greenfield site outside of the city or the state. 6° The Hathcock court
156. See Kurth, supra note 63.
157. Ryerson, 35 Mich. at 346 (Campbell, J., concurring).
158. Id.
159. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 786. Contrary to the Hathcock court's statement that the
Poletown court held profit maximization by General Motors constituted a public use, the
Poletown court focused upon the public necessity and benefit: "The power of eminent
domain is to be used in this instance primarily to accomplish the essential public purposes
of alleviating unemployment and revitalizing the economic base of the community. The
benefit to a private interest is merely incidental." Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 459.
160. Justice Ryan himself was not convinced that profit maximization was the
motivation behind GM's willingness to undertake the project. In his dissent he stated:
What is reported here is not meant to denigrate either the role or the good faith of
GeneralMotors Corporation. It is aprivate, profit-making enterprise. Its managers
are answerable to a demanding board of directors who, in turn, have a fiduciary
obligation to the corporation's shareholders. It is struggling to compete worldwide
in a depressed economy. It is a corporation having a history, especially in recent
years, of a responsible, even admirable "social conscience." In fact, this project
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appears to have been swayed in shaping its reasoning by superficial
arguments of Poletown critics, unproven facts and claims about originalism,
none of which apply to the case.'61 If Poletown were about maximizing
General Motors' profits, the Poletown court itself could not have upheld the
taking, based upon the principles proffered by the majority in the case. 162
Justice Young, writing for the Hatchcock court, distinguished between
the terms "purpose" and "use" and adopted the "public use" interpretation
of Justice Ryan contained in his Poletown dissent.'63 Ryan limits the
transfer of property acquired through eminent domain to private persons or
corporations falling within three artificial categories of cases decided before
the adoption of the 1963 Constitution: (1) where a public necessity of the
extreme sort exists,' 64 (2) when the private entity remains accountable to the
maywell entail compromises of sound business dictates and concomitant financial
sacrifices to avoid the worsening unemployment and economic depression which
would result if General Motors were to move from the state of Michigan as other
major employers have.
Id. at 470 n.9 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
161. See Linder, supra note 14; See also Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765. The underpinning
of eminent domain and the "public use" limitation is public necessity. Michigan case law
leaves no doubt that public necessity is a term defined by the changing needs of society.
Originalism is not relevant in determining the meaning of a term that is controlled by the
circumstances and time at which a taking occurs other than to validate that the term was
intended by the people ratifying the constitution to be flexible in providing for community
needs.
162. The use of eminent domain to maximize profits for General Motors would not
have met the Poletown's "heightened scrutiny" requirement that the public benefit be more
than speculative or marginal but must be clear and significant if it is to be within the
legitimate purpose for eminent domain as provided by the legislature. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d
at 459-60.
163. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 782-83; Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 464. The Hathcock
court, with the exception of Justice Weaver in concurrence, adopts without modification
Justice Ryan's position with respect to the meaning of "public use" based upon categorizing
Michigan eminent domain cases decided prior to the adoption of the 1963 Michigan
Constitution. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 781. The court also concludes, again with the
exception of Justice Weaver, that the term "public use" is to be interpreted based upon the
"commonunderstanding of that phrase among those sophisticated in the law at ratification,"
freezing the meaning as of 1963. Id. at 780-81. It appears that Justice Ryan is the only
"sophisticated person" to whom the court looks for guidance in discerning the meaning of
"public use." Id. at 780-88. Justice Ryan has a highly respected record on both the Michigan
and federal court benches. Nevertheless, he did not become a trial judge until 1967 (3rd
Circuitof Michigan), four years after the 1963 Michigan Constitution was adopted, making
it curious and injudicious that his views alone were adopted, without any mention or serious
consideration of the views also expressed at the time or later by other jurists, property
lawyers or scholars "sophisticated in the law," if such a standard were appropriate to apply.
(For the author's rejection of the Hathcock standard and the principles of originalism for
interpreting "public use" see infra text accompanying notes 169-76).
164. The Hathcock court has modified the labeling of JusticeRyan's first category from
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public, 65 and (3) when the property is selected on facts of independent
public significance. 166 Ryan's approach is entirely arbitrary. It limits
"Public Necessity of the Extreme Sort Otherwise Impracticable" to "Public Necessity of the
Extreme Sort," suggesting a more rigid standard for necessity. Hathcock, 471 Mich. at 473.
However, there are no Michigan cases striking down the useof eminent domain on the basis
that they lacked "public necessity of the extreme sort" when the court found that the public
was primarily to benefit and private benefits were merely incidental. No "public necessity
of an extreme sort" has been needed to support eminent domain as that term is commonly
understood. The term public necessity of the extreme sort was used by Justice Cooley to
describe the necessity that exists when a private railroad selects a route for its track and a
landowner refuses to transfer the land needed to constructthe line. Ryerson, 35 Mich. at 340.
"A railroad cannot go around the farm of every unwilling person, and the business of
transporting persons and property for long distances by rail, which has been found so
essential to the general enjoyment and welfare could never have existed if it were in the
power of any unwilling person to stop the road at his boundary, or to demand unreasonable
terms as a condition of passing him." Salem, 20 Mich. at 482. In fact, as noted by Justice
Ryan in his Poletown dissent, thecourt has referred to lesser necessity standards interms of
"overriding public necessity" and "necessity ... otherwise impracticable" Poletown, 304
N.W.2d at 478 nn. 19-20 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
165. The Hathcock court has also modified the labeling of Justice Ryan's second
category. Whereas Ryan categorizes the cases as those involving "continuing accountability
to thepublic," the Hathcock court uses the description "wherethe property remains subject
to public oversight after transfer to aprivate entity." Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 783. Neither
description captures the essence of the principle contained in the cases, which is that the
private entity will continue to use the condemned property for the public necessity unless
it terminates all use. Many railroads have gone out of business and no longer benefit the
public or have terminated lines of service which they acquired by eminent domain. In
Poletown, the development agreement required that General Motors build a 2,000,000
square foot modem manufacturing plant on property condemned by the City of Detroit to
address the need to alleviate staggering local unemployment. The only practical use of one
of the world's major manufacturing complexes would be large scale manufacturing
operations requiring the continuous employment of thousands of local workers directly and
many more in supplier industries located near the complex, whether the plant is owned and
operated by General Motors or a successor corporation. The Poletown plant has operated
continuously since its completion in the early 1980s, employing thousands of workers daily.
Concern has been expressed that General Motors might decide to shut down the plant at
some time in the future. If it did, General Motors' actions would be no different than a
railroad corporation discontinuing a line of service to the public, as many have done.
166. This third category attempts to explain eminent domain decisions that do not fall
within the other two groupings. Both the Hathcock court and Justice Ryan agree on the
description: "when the property is selected on facts of independent public significance."
Hathcock, 684 N.W. 2d at 783; Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 478 (Ryan, J., dissenting). This
category draws especially sharp criticism from Justice Weaver in her concurring opinion.
She reasoned that:
If, instead of the common understanding of "public use," future courts rely on
"facts of independent public significance" to determine whether a condemnation
is for a "public use," then it is easy to imagine how the people's limit on the
exercise of eminent domain might be eroded. For example, a municipality could
declare the lack of a two-car garage to be evidence of blight, as has been
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eminent domain to those situations where (1) the legislature has previously
authorized the use of the power and (2) eminent domain disputes have come
before the court. It does not include historical circumstances of public
necessity where eminent domain was not authorized by the legislature or
circumstances arising out of changing conditions of society. No other cases
or scholars have independently concluded that the use of eminent domain
in Michigan is limited to the three categories defined by Justice Ryan.
Significantly, Justice Cooley's writings do not support the categorical
approach of Justice Ryan and the Hathcock court to interpreting the term
"public use." Cooley focused upon the need to address "public necessity"
in exercising eminent domain. In this connection, Cooley stated in People
ex rel. Detroit & Howell R.R. Co. v. Township Board of Salem: "If we
examine the subject critically, we shall find that the most important
consideration in the case of eminent domain is the necessity of
accomplishing some public good which is otherwise impracticable, and we
shall also find that the law does not so much regard the means as the
attempted in Lakewood, Ohio orjustify condemning a small brake repair business
so that the property can be use for a hardware store, as has been attempted in
Mesa, Arizona.
Hathcock 684N.W.2d at 797 (Weaver, J., concurring). The principal Michigan case placed
in this category is In re Slum Clearance. 50 N.W.2d 340 (Mich. 1951). Like in Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), eminent domain was used to take property in an area where
slum conditions existed and presented a threat to the public health, safety, morals and
welfare of the community. In re Slum Clearance, 50 N.W.2d at 341. The "public purpose"
and "public necessity" were the elimination of slums, according to the court. Id. at 342-43.
The property was planned to be resold to private entities for redevelopment after acquisition
and slum clearance. Id. In each case, however, the property owners objecting to the taking
did not own "slum" property. Id. In Berman they owned a department store and In re Slum
Clearance a pipe and supply business. Id. Their property did not involve "facts of
independent significance" pertaining to slum conditions. Facilitating economic development
by assembling a marketable site for resale was an integral part of "public use" in taking their
property in these two cases. If it were not, there would be no necessity for using eminent
domain to forcibly take the owners' standard commercial property. See In re Brewster Street
Housing Site, 289 N.W. 493, 502 (Mich. 1939); In re Jefferies Homes Housing Project, 11
N.W.2d272 (Mich. 1943) (sanctioning the taking ofproperty to build low cost housing). See
also In re Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of Act No. 346 of Public Acts of 1966, 158
N.W.2d 416 (Mich. 1968) (approving the use of eminent domain to develop low-cost
housing). Nonetheless, in Hathcock, the court held that "alleviating unemployment and
revitalizing the economic base of the community" cannot be found to be a "public use"
under any circumstances. 684 N.W.2d at 787. The Hathcock court draws an arbitrary and
irrational distinction between alleviating unemployment, reducing poverty, and eliminating
slum conditions with respect to the "public use" of property for a public necessity to serve
the public good. The cause of slum conditions is unemployment and entrenched poverty that
resultsin residents being incapable of supporting decent, safe and sanitaryshelter, adversely
affecting the health and welfare of the community.
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need." ,'
67
As importantly, Cooley concludes that "public use" is to be interpreted
as a dynamic term addressing the changing needs of society and not frozen
in time. In his treatise he advises:
The reason of the case and the settled practice of free governments
must be our guides in determining what is or is not to be regarded
a public use; and that only can be considered such where the
government is supplying its own needs, or is furnishing facilities
for its citizens in regard to those matters of public necessity,
convenience, or welfare, which, on account of their peculiar
character, and the difficulty-perhaps impossibility-of making
provision for them otherwise, it is alike proper, useful, and needful
for the government to provide. 6'
Notwithstanding the reverence which the Hathcock court extends to Justice
Cooley, these two examples and others in the Hathcock opinion stand the
work of the court's patron saint on its head.
VII. ORIGINALISM
169
Hathcock's most radical departure from Michigan takings jurisprudence
was the adoption of "originalism" principles to interpret the term "public
use." Under this approach, the meaning of the term is frozen at the time of
167. Salem, 20 Mich. at 480-8 1.
168. COOLEY,supra note 47, at 660. See also Swan, 2 Mich. 427; Hays, 25 N.W.2d at
787. In Hays, the court stated:
A public use changes with changing conditions of society, new appliances in the
sciences, and other changes brought about by an increase in population and by
new modes of transportation and communication. The courts as a rule have
attempted no judicial definition of a public as distinguished from a private
purpose, but have left each case to be determined by its own peculiar
circumstances... The test of public use is not based upon the function or capacity
in which or by which the use is furnished. The right of the public to receive and
enjoy the benefit of the use determines whether the use is public or private.
Id. at 790-91. In the words of Justice Cooley: "More accurately [eminent domain] is the
rightful authority, which exists in every sovereignty, to control and regulate those rights of
a public nature which pertain to its citizens in common, and to appropriate and control
individual property for the public benefit, as the public safety, necessity, convenience, or
welfare may demand." COOLEY, supra note 47, at 649.
169. See generally Linder,supra note 14. "We can uncoverthe commonunderstanding
of art 10, § 2 only by delving into [Michigan eminent domain] case law, and thereby
determining the 'common understanding' among those sophisticated in the law at the time
of the Constitution's ratification." Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 780-81.
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the adoption of the constitution. 170 Whatever application "originalism" may
have to other sections of the Constitution, it has none to interpreting the
term "public use," which is well understood in Michigan eminent domain
law to be dependent upon the evolving necessities of the community.' 7
Whether the Hathcock court chose to rely upon the common understanding
of the people of Michigan with respect to the meaning of "public use" or the
understanding of "persons sophisticated in the law," as discussed below, the
clarity of previous decisions of the court makes it beyond reason to
conclude that the use of eminent domain is limited to those types of public
necessities for which eminent domain was used prior to 1963. Nonetheless
that is precisely what the Hathcock court held. In the words of the court:
Because Poletown's conception of a public use-that of
'alleviating unemployment and revitalizing the economic base of
the community'-has no support in the Court's eminent domain
jurisprudence before the Constitution's ratification, its
interpretation of 'public use' in art 10, sec 2 cannot reflect the
common understanding of that phrase among those sophisticated in
the law at ratification.
172
Hathcock's own groupings of eminent domain cases are undermined by
an originalism approach to interpreting "public use." The third
category-when the property is selected upon facts of independent public
significance-would be meaningless under originalism. The very definition
of the category makes sense only when the significance of the facts are
evaluated on the date they occur, not an earlier date when the constitution
was adopted. Ryan's third category is based primarily on the court's
holding in the case In re Slum Clearance in City of Detroit, decided in
195 1,173 with respect to the meaning of the term "public use" contained in
the Constitution of 1908.174 Precedent for taking private slum property for
clearance and transfer to private persons for the elimination of slums and
redevelopment prior to 1908 was nonexistent. Hathcock's originalism
theory applied to the slum clearance case would lead to the following
reasoning: because In re Slum Clearance's conception of a public use-that
of eliminating housing conditions detrimental to the public peace, health,
170. Hathcock 684 N.W.2d at 780-8 1.
171. Silver Creek Drain Dist. v. Extrusions Div., Inc., 663 N.W.2d 436 (Mich. 2003);
Peterman v. Dep't of Natural Res., 521 N.W.2d 499 (Mich. 1994).
172. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 787.
173. 50 N.W.2d 340 (Mich. 1951).
174. MICH. CONST. of 1908, art. XIII, §§ 1, 5.
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safety, morals, and welfare, and to aid in re-planning and reconstruction of
the area involved-has no support in the court's eminent domain
jurisprudence before the ratification of the Constitution of 1908, its
interpretation of "public use" cannot reflect the common understanding of
that phrase among those sophisticated in the law at ratification. Similarly,
with respect to the holding in Swan v. Williams, support for the taking of
private property in Michigan by a private railroad to further its operations
did not exist at the time of the adoption of the Northwest Ordinance in
1787175 or prior to the Michigan Constitution of 1835.176
VIII. PERSONS SOPHISTICATED IN THE LAW 177
At this point, the reader should be asking why the Hathcock court relies
upon the common understanding among those "sophisticated in the law at
ratification" in its interpretation of the term "public use," rather than the
understanding of the people who ratified the constitution. Justice Weaver
was highly critical of the approach in her concurring opinion.' The court's
reasoning is flawed and based upon a misinterpretation of the principle
expounded by Justice Cooley that "technical terms" are to be interpreted on
the basis of the understanding of those sophisticated in the law. The
example of a technical term which Cooley uses in his treatise are the Latin
words "ex post facto."'1 79 He concluded that technical terms had acquired a
175. 1787 Gov't of Northwest Territory, art II.
176. MICH. CONST. of 1908, art. XIII, §§ 1, 5.
177. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 788-94 (Weaver, J., concurring).
178. Id. There are three fundamental rules of constitutional construction contained in
Michigan case law. The first and primary rule is the rule of common understanding. The
interpretation that should be given to a constitutional provision is that which reasonable
minds would give it. The second rule is that to clarify the meaning of a constitutional
provision, the circumstances surrounding its adoption and the purpose sought to be
accomplished by the provision may be considered. Third, whenever possible, a construction
that does not create constitutional invalidity is preferred to one that does, and no
constitutional provision should be construed to nullify or impair another. Council No. 11,
Am. Federation of State, County and Mun. Emp. (AFSCME), AFL-CIO v. Michigan Civil
Serv, Comm'n, 292 N.W.2d 442 (Mich. 1980); Council ofOrg. andOthers for Educ. About
Parochiaid, Inc. v. Governor, 566 N.W.2d 208, 215 (1977); In re Proposal C., 185 N.W.2d
914 (Mich. 1971).
179.
But it must not be forgotten, in construing our constitutions, that in many
particulars they are but the legitimate successors of the great charters of English
liberty, whose provisions declaratory of the rights of the subject have acquired a
well-understood meaning, which the people must be supposed to have had in view
in adopting them. We cannot understand these provisions unless we understand
their history; and when we find themexpressed in technical words, and words of
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well understood meaning in legal history, which the people must be
assumed to have meant in adopting them. Irrationally seizing upon this
principle, the Hathcock court declared that "public use" was a technical
term, confounding Cooley's work once again. Justice Cooley's widely
known view, as referenced in the Hathcock opinion itself, was that the term
"public use" was not well understood either by those sophisticated in the
law or the public. His frequently quoted words are: "We find ourselves
somewhat at sea, however, when we undertake to define, in the light of the
judicial decisions, what constitutes a public use. '8s Moreover, Justice
Cooley never described "public use" as a technical term in his landmark
opinions or treatise, nor did he ever hold that the term was to be understood
as frozen in meaning on the date of the 1850 Constitution upon which his
eminent domain decisions rested. The great irony in the Hathcock court's
specious reasoning is that while attempting to introduce "originalism" into
Michigan takings jurisprudence, the court adopts the commonly understood
meaning today of the words "technical term" to mistakenly interpret
Cooley's original use of the term in the 19' Century.
The meaning to be arrived at in constitutional construction is the intent
of the people of the state who ratified the Constitution and they are deemed
to have intended the meaning most obvious to the common understanding.
Cooley cautioned against the sophisticated approach used by the Hathcock
court when he said: "Narrow and technical reasoning is misplaced when it
is brought to bear upon an instrument framed by the people themselves, for
themselves, and designed as a chart upon which every man, learned and
unlearned, may be able to trace the leading principles of government. Is1
LX. CONCLUSION
The Hathcock court has no basis under article X, section 2 of the
Michigan Constitution of 1963 for overruling Poletown. The holding in
Hathcock is neither consistent with the writings of Justice Thomas Cooley,
art, we must suppose these words to be employed in their technical sense. When
the Constitution speaks of an ex post facto law, it means a law technically known
by that designation; the meaning of the phrase having become defined in the
history of constitutional law, and being so familiar to the people that it is not
necessary to imply language of a more popular character to designate it. The
technical sense in these cases is the sense popularly understood, because that is the
sense fixed upon the words in legal and constitutional history where they have
been employed for the protection of popular rights.
COOLEY, supra note 47, at 72-73.
180. COOLEY, supra note 47, at 659.
181. Id. at 72-73.
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Michigan case law, or the will of the people of Michigan who ratified the
Constitution. While it was a difficult and controversial case, Poletown
properly upheld the use of the power of eminent domain to "alleviat[e]
unemployment and revitaliz[e] the economic base of community" when the
court found that a public necessity existed, the benefits to the public were
primary and to a private corporation merely incidental.
The concern of the Hathcock court that local governments in Michigan
were unchecked in abusing the power of eminent domain to further the
economic interests of favored private businesses could and should have
been addressed by the court by clarifying the principles of Poletown, rather
than by discarding the holding. Under the Poletown principles, takings were
required to benefit private persons or corporations only incidentally and to
provide for a public necessity, consistent with over 100 years of Michigan
eminent domain jurisprudence. It is clear that courts in Michigan have the
prerogative to determine when the public benefit from a taking is primary
and the public necessity requirement is met. With the elimination of the
judicial tribunal in the constitution of 1963, clarification is required with
respect to the degree of deference to be extended to the legislature's
determination of public necessity, which is where the Hathcock court's
attention should have been focused.
Clarification and judicious enforcement of the Poletown principles
within the bounds of Michigan takings jurisprudence would have provided
the proper balance between the rights of property owners whose land is
being taken and the good of the community in which the property is located.
Instead, the Hathcock court legislated a new and unwise ideological
solution to controlling the potential abusive use of the power of eminent
domain by state and local governments. Members of the state legislature
who support the Hathcock court's holding worry that a future Michigan
Supreme Court may set aside the Hathcock decision and return to the
principles of Poletown.l8 2 Accordingly, they are proposing to amend the
Constitution to modify the "public use" language.8 3 They have reason to
worry. Michigan takings jurisprudence does not support the Hathcock
holding.
182. See Clear Language Is Needed To Protect Property Rights, available at
http://www.detnews.com/2005/editorial/0510/22/E07-357029.htm (last visited Nov. 28,
2005).
183. See State Constitutional Amendment on Eminent Domain to be on 2006 Ballot;
Would Strengthen Private Property Rights, available at www.crainsdetroit.com/cgi-
bin/search.pl (last visited Jan. 23, 2006).
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